Pr. Thierry GARCIN[1]
[1] Politologist, Doctor of State (HDR), associate researcher at the University Paris Cité, specialist in the study of armed conflict, nuclear weapons and Arctic issues, Thierry Garcin taught in Paris I, Paris III and at the Institute of Political Studies (IEP) in Paris. Visiting professor at Sorbonne Abu Dhabi, lecturer at ENA and then at the National Institute of Public Service (INSP), he is a researcher at the HEC Geopolitics Centre. Producer delegated to Radio-France, he was responsible for 33 years of the daily broadcast ” International Issues ” He is the author of many books, such as Arctic Geopolitics (2 ed., Paris, Economica, 2021) or The German question in Europe since unification (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2025).
Executive Summary: In the dual context of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the only European nuclear power with France, and the strengthening of doubts about the American nuclear protection of Europe (Trump II Presidency), should we change the French nuclear doctrine, which obeys its own imperatives? The central question is whether France’s “vital interests” can be extended to the rest of Europe, breaking with the fundamental principle of uncertainty. Promise something, isn’t it already lying in anticipation? And, first – heavy responsibility before history – divide the French on a strategy that has always united them?
Keywords: Dissuasion, Nuclear, De Gaulle, France, Europe, NATO.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. IS FRENCH STRIKE FORCE EXPORTABLE TO THE REST OF EUROPE ?
Abstract : In the dual context of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union – London is the only European nuclear power besides France – and the increasing doubts about nuclear protection of Europe by the United States (Trump second mandate), must the French nuclear doctrine be modified, given it has its own imperatives? The key question is to know if the notion of “vital interests” has to be enlarged to the profit of the rest of Europe, which would break with the fundamental uncertainty principle? Isn’t promising something already a lie by anticipation? And, first and foremost, wouldn’t it be be a heavy burden of responsibility before History to divide the French people on the strategy of deterrence, which has always unified them?
Key words : Deterrence, Nuclear, De Gaulle, France, Europe, NATO.
DO WE MAKE A BREAKDOWN OF THE FRANÇAIS FRAPPE FORCE, with the sovereignty that presides over it? The question arises even more acutely as Paris ritually celebrates the ” European sovereignty oxymore expression since there cannot exist two simultaneously, French and European. In addition, an announcement by the President of the French Republic on deterrence (several times postponed) was planned for early 2026. This crucial issue goes far beyond the innumerable variations in the European security architecture, which the second Trump Presidency has in any case shaken.
Firstly, what about the supporters of the Europeanisation of the French nuclear arsenal? Then why are their arguments not admissible? And what strategic stalemates would we move towards?
Supporters of Europeanisation
In reassuring anachronisms, as if the current strategic debates were in the continuity of the 1950s and 1960s, the “Europeanists” recall that in 1957 a tripartite defence protocol (France, Italy, FRG) envisaged its extension to future nuclear weapons; that in 1963, the automaticity of the French commitment to the FRG had been promised orally and confidentially by De Gaulle to Adenauer; in 1972, White Paper on National Defence (Tome 1) was ambiguous: “…The purely national and essentially defensive nature of deterrence appears here. How are the vital interests of a country defined if not by reference to that country itself? ? ” But, a little further: ” Our vital interests lie in our territory and its approaches »[1]. Finally, we try to make General De Gaulle know what we want him to say (claiming the General, the French extreme right has become a champion in this balancing exercise).
In view of the gradual disengagement of the United States from the European continent, the war in Ukraine and the Russian aggression, Germany and Poland are seeking French nuclear insurance, whose necessity and virtues are suddenly praised. As a result, it is necessary to broaden the vital interests From France to Elbe or to Warsaw, even Tallinn. The joint London and Paris Declarations (1995, 2003, 2025) are used.[2] ensuring that their vital interests were linked, which assumes strangely that they are already known, defined and comparable or identical. It is true that France can agree with the United Kingdom for coordination of patrols of nuclear submarine launchers (SNLE) and targeting. In addition, both countries are bound by the Lancaster House (2010) on the validation of nuclear loads in both countries[3]. In the long term, therefore, ” vital interests European States and the European Union (sic) (will be) covered by nuclear deterrence (both from France and NATO) “It’s an expert,” says an expert.
And there is no shortage of concrete proposals. Let us start by flying French nuclear Rafale from the neighbours, without, and then with their nuclear weapons. Then let’s go up in power, according to the well-known American technique of spill over, or irreversible cliquet : European refuelling in flight, reception on foreign air bases, creation of a European squadron of the French Strategic Nuclear Forces, possible installation of French nuclear weapons on European aircraft, observer status in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, until the financing of French nuclear forces by the allies (Germany, creditor of the French strike force, then having a voice in targeting). Of course, we will have to ” adapter (sic) the French arsenal, mount a European PC (command post), ask the United States for permission to use NATO means without hiring Washington (temporary hardship), etc. Imagination with no limit, a German minister proposes a crazy system of ” random rotation of (nuclear) responsibilities between Member States »[4]. The idea, admittedly, is to pass in force: 1) because we do not know what the presidential election of 2027 reserves for us, and 2) to create “previouss” while it is still time (Macron Presidency).
In return for this French nuclear protection, the other Europeans will provide a ” dissuasion (sic) conventionnelle (classical dissuasion in French, i.e. non-nuclear). As if said ” dissuasion classique In addition, Putin’s Russia was in front of himself… Here we duplicate the ” integrated strategy » of the United States (Nuclear Posture Review, 2022)[5] where conventional forces and nuclear forces are increasingly interdependent, cleverly welded by an anti-missile dome (recovery as the Skyshield German-American-Israeli and licensed manufacturing in Germany of Patriot American missile for the benefit of four European countries). All this, with the risk of entering the battle, the ” refusal of the battle » being precisely one of the prohibitions of the French nuclear strategy[6]. Here we find the ghost of the European Defence Community (CED, 1950-1954) and ” European Army where the French classical forces were diluted in a large Atlanticist ensemble commanded by the United States or, more fantasy today, by a Franco-German duo, or even a surrealist trio Franco-Germano-Polish (when we know the antagonisms that have torn these three countries…). Moreover, France’s proposals, proud and repeated, in favour of a ” strategic autonomy Europeans are curiously vilified. It is obviously a sign of national selfishness and arrogance: we will teach him humility. By construction, nuclear weapons are not very “humb”. Neither the United States nor Russia nor China nor Israel nor Pakistan nor North Korea appear to be very humble in this regard.
A Europeanized French strike force?
Certainly, on many occasions, France’s nuclear doctrine has been seriously distorted. ” Wider dissuasion President Giscard d’Estaing, ” European doctrine of deterrence (President François Mitterrand); ” concerted deterrence (Alain Juppé) ” common European defence (President Jacques Chirac); accession in 2010 to ” a missile defence capability to protect the populations, territory and forces of all NATO European countries (Presidency Nicolas Sarkozy), a commitment contrary to the strategy of deterrence which is thus expected to fail. In 1983, France had voted against the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or ” Star Wars President Ronald Reagan, and in 2022 she opposed Skyshield, anti-Atlantic-Israeli missile shield already mentioned. We must also recall the impressive slaloms and the various strategic confusions of President Emmanuel Macron, during his two terms. By parenthesis, however, it happens to the French President to be right: of course France would not use nuclear weapons against Russia that used tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
At this stage, major contradictions must be noted.
Firstly, France would partly replace the United States in continental Europe, even though they had ceased to withdraw from their nuclear responsibilities during East-West relations, at the cost of a succession of nobles ” strategic concepts » very fluctuating. Secondly, the Europeans fear that they too loudly promote the French nuclear rescue wheel, so as not to precipitate the American partial withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance (delicate illusion). Finally, Europe is an umpteenth time presented as the ” second pillar of NATO (doctrine of the 1960s…), while the United States no longer relies heavily on the first pillar. Last contradiction: Germany is so European that Chancellor Friedrich Merz served President Donald Trump in 2025: ” And if you don’t want Europe, at least make Germany your partner »[7].
But the most serious concerns the extensibility of ” vital interests However, this is contrary to the basic principle of uncertainty, which governs the use or non-use of nuclear weapons. To promise is to lie in anticipation. By the way, one may wonder whether Marseille or Lyon are in the vital interests of Berlin, Warsaw or Vilnius. There is also some naivety or some wheel to applaud the German military pretensions, which do not lack clarity. Chancellor Scholz said in 2022: ” Germany will soon have Europe’s largest conventional army in NATO. (…) As the most populated nation, with the greatest economic power and situated in the centre of the continent, our army must become the pillar of conventional defence in Europe, the best equipped armed force in Europe. »[8] ? And did candidate Merz not repeat in 2025: ” (We will have the army) the most powerful conventionally (…) It is only justice for the most populous and powerful country in Europe. This is also what our friends and partners expect of us. More than that, they demand (sic) »[9] ? In addition to the fact that Germany has stopped changing caps with great godilla strokes on essential subjects (energy, immigration, defense…)[10], it is necessary to underline the long-term versatility of European democratic governments, much more subject to the vagaries of public opinion than is believed. Their major decisions are often seasonal. In any case, Berlin’s martial momentum is reminiscent of some terrible memories. And their need for French nuclear weapons also circumvents Berlin’s commitments (1952, 1954, 1990) not to manufacture, possess or… control (just) this type of weapon. Moreover, we know the complications inherent in the American system of ” double key In Europe, London tasted its very relative charms in the 1950s.
Poland, which also shares some unfortunate memories with Germany, is not left behind, in a strange reciprocal competition that is fundamentally explained by very different relations with Moscow. ” (We want) own the strongest and largest army in Europe In May 2025, Prime Minister Donald Tusk launched in an unhealthy race with Berlin. Moreover, Poland presents itself as the focal point of the Atlantic Alliance in the East and demands ” the review of nuclear deterrence NATO (combined application in 2023 from Poland, Lithuania and Latvia) to participate in the ” nuclear sharing (no less), while wanting to be Belarus’s Atlanticist nuclear counterpart towards Russia and while benefiting from the French nuclear protection officially designated as ” Supplement »[11]. Even as the French requirement of ” stricte suffisance (neither too much nor too little nuclear weapons) is incompatible with the coverage of the European continent.
To simplify the reasoning, the British arsenal rarely seems to be relevant, as if it did not depend on European and transatlantic nuclear equations. It is true that London entrusted its strike force to the Atlantic Alliance, while reserving a party for its own purposes. In addition, the United Kingdom is by no means operationally independent (launchers Sortdent U.S., whose maintenance and codes are left at the discretion of the U.S. Kings Bay (State of Georgia, United States), nuclear charges – certainly – British but installed in the United States). And it does not yet have F-35 bomb carriers, which American aircraft do not fly around the world – should we remind them? – only according to the technical goodwill of the United States. Finally, the United Kingdom kept a detestable memory of its 1950s ground-to-ground missile project (Blue Streak). It should be noted that a dozen European F-35 buyers (pending the rest) voluntarily passed the pass in the American lasso. And that, probably for about forty years.
In this entanglement of atomic claims that are often tangled, we also note the considerable risk of being led by the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has already been directly requisitioned – outside the UN mandate – by the three Western permanent members of the UN Security Council against Serbia (Kosovo, 1999) and – outside the UN mandate – outside Libya (2011), indirectly mobilized outside Washington in the Iraq War (2003) and in the Afghanistan War (2001-2021). But only this last war was not… illegal. In addition, during the US attack on Iran (2025), NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte applauded breaking everything to this violation of international law, in a message to President Donald Trump: ” Congratulations and thanks for your decisive action in Iran. It’s really extraordinary and something nobody else had dared to do. It makes us safer »[12]. Finally, it should be noted that no Community foreign policy – in the course of thirty-two years of the European Union – supports a possible European defence policy, which is, however, the prerequisite.[13]. To speak of European defence without mentioning the absence of European foreign policy is to organise an officially agreed deal. And that’s putting the plow before the ox, or rather without the ox. With the key, the historical responsibility to raise the French citizens against each other.
In short, France appears to be tired of the heaviness of the nuclear task, maintaining the illusion of spreading it on other European shoulders, as if it would alleviate the infinite loneliness which is the own nuclear weapon and one of the reasons for its effectiveness. The prohibition of war[14].
[1] White Paper on National Defence, 1972, lien : https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/defense/lb1972.htm (accessed February 9, 2026).
[2] Joint press conference by Mr Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, and Mr John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, on Franco-British cooperation, nuclear test ban, European Union, EMU and Bosnia, 18ème Sommet franco-britannique, Londres, 30 Octobre 1995, lien : https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/178978-conference-de-presse-conjointe-de-mm-jacques-chirac-president-de-la-re (accessed 9 February 2026); Statement by Mr Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, on Franco-British cooperation for conflict prevention and development in Africa, 26ème Franco-British Summit, London, November 24, 2003, link: https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/141778-declaration-de-m-jacques-chirac-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-coo (accessed 9 February 2026); Statement of 37ème Sommet franco-britannique, Londres, 14 Juillet 2025, lien : https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/07/14/declaration-du-37e-sommet-franco-britannique (accessed February 9, 2026).
[3]London Treaties (or Lancaster House Agreements): Treaty between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Joint Radiographic and Hydrodynamic Facilities, Londres (Lancaster House) 2 Novembre 2010, 14 p., lien : https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/291845_BST_hydro_French_Text_Formatted__Final_6.pdf (accessed 9 February 2026); Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Londres (Lancaster House), 2 Novembre 2010, 11 p., lien : https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/291846_BST_Co-operation_French_Text_Formatted__Final___6_.pdf (accessed February 9, 2026).
[4] Lamb Laurent, “For a German elected candidate, a ‘European nuclear dissuasion’ can only function under the aegis of Berlin”, Opex360, 2 Juillet 2025, lien : https://www.opex360.com/2025/07/02/pour-un-elu-allemand-une-dissuasion-nucleaire-europeenne-ne-pourra-fonctionner-que-sous-legide-de-berlin/ (accessed February 9, 2026).
[5] “2022 Nuclear Posture Review”, 26 p., in 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States, U.S. Department of Defense, 27 Octobre 2022, 80 p., lien : https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (accessed February 9, 2026).
[6] From the same author, “French nuclear weapon does not share”, Geopoweb, 12 Septembre 2025, lien : https://geopoweb.fr/?L-ARME-NUCLEAIRE-FRANCAISE-NE-SE-PARTAGE-PAS-Thierry-GARCIN (accessed 9 February 2026); See also: The future of nuclear weapons, Brussels, Bruylant, 1995, 152 pp. (prefect of General Pierre M. Gallois).
[7] Sortcot Catherine, ” Friedrich Merz to Donald Trump: ‘So at least make Germany your partner’, Regards.fr, 11 December 2025, link : https://regards.fr/friedrich-merz-a-donald-trump-alors-faites-au-moins-de-lallemagne-votre-partenaire/ (accessed February 9, 2026).
[8] Lamb Laurent, “Germany has the ambition to acquire the most ‘major conventional army’ in Europe”, Opex360, 29 Juin 2022, lien : https://www.opex360.com/2022/06/29/lallemagne-a-lambition-de-se-doter-de-la-plus-grande-armee-conventionnelle-deurope/ (accessed February 9, 2026).
[9] Conesa Elsa, “Chancellor Friedrich Merz wants the German army to be ‘the most powerful in Europe on a conventional level’,” The World, 15 Mai 2025, lien : https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/05/15/en-allemagne-friedrich-merz-promet-l-armee-la-plus-puissante-d-europe-sur-le-plan-conventionnel_6606169_3210.html (accessed February 9, 2026).
[10] From the same author, The German question in Europe since unification, Paris, L-Harmattan, 2025, 272 p. See Chapter XI: “The return of German temptations”, pp. 222-226.
[11] Pala Melike, “Poland wants to build ‘the most powerful army in Europe’,” said the Prime Minister, Agence Anadolu, 2 Janvier 2026, lien : https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/monde/la-pologne-veut-b%C3%A2tir-l-arm%C3%A9e-la-plus-puissante-d-europe-annonce-le-premier-ministre/3787569 (accessed February 9, 2026).
[12] “‘Great success’, ‘extraordinary’, ‘decisive action in Iran’: Donald Trump reveals the flattering message of Mark Rutte,” Le Figaro (avec AFP), 24 Juin 2025, lien : https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/grand-succes-extraordinaire-action-decisive-en-iran-donald-trump-revele-le-message-flatteur-de-mark-rutte-20250624 (accessed February 9, 2026).
[13] From the same author: “European defence: a long contempt? ” Diploweb, 23 Octobre 2022, lien : https://www.diploweb.com/La-defense-europeenne-une-longue-meprise.html (accessed February 9, 2026).
[14] With the kind permission of La Vigie (https://www.lettrevigie.com/), originally published on 9 January 2026.
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