Hall GARDNER
Professor and chair, International comparative Politics Department, American University of Paris
3eme trimestre 2012
Introduction
Let me first thank Mr Rastbeen and Geostrategiques for inviting me to speak at this important conference. Te nature of the US-Saudi relationship as it relates to questions of democracy and human rights is one the most important questions confronting American policymakers today.
My argument is that domestic demands for democratic reform (involving the protection of minority groups and guarantee of human rights for all people in general) that have arisen during the « Arab Spring » since December 2010 indicate that some form of significant social and political change involving a deeper understanding of human rights in Saudi Arabia is long overdue.
But before I discuss the questions of democracy and human rights, I want to first provide a realist assessment of the political tensions that are quite evident in US-Saudi relations and which have been most profoundly impacted by the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, followed by the « global war on terrorism. »
I then want to provide some reasons as to why the US and Saudi Arabia may be able to find some elements of compromise on human rights policy, to be followed by the implementation of significant social and political reforms.
I then conclude, based on the nature of debates that took place in 1948 in the formulation of UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that that Saudi delegation did not necessarily abstain from signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights due to considerations of Islamic law alone. While the Saudi brand of Wahhabism did play a role, Saudi abstention was based on other considerations as well, including the social and cultural impact of European imperialism, opposition to demands for national self-determination as a human right, the question of women’s rights and equality, plus questions involving general role of society as a whole in protecting individuals. In light of the issues raised by « Arab Spring » (which, as shall argued, represents a misnomer), there is hope for continuing dialogue between the US, Europeans and differing Islamic factions, including Wahhabist.
Te fact that other Islamic countries signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (with Pakistan paving the way) indicates that the debate on human rights is not necessarily that of the so-called « clash of civilizations » between the West and Islam, but rather, a clash between slightly differing US and European conceptions of human rights, differing conceptions of the developing world, and differing conceptions of rival Islamic viewpoints.
Saudi Arabia and Reform
Te path to implementing deep structural reforms that will help diversify the Saudi economy and provide greater liberties will not be easy and will require firm and effective Saudi leadership. Tus far, the Arab monarchist regimes (Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states) have tended to postpone much needed reforms for as long as possible. In only permitting incremental change, these monarchist states have thus far sailed through the Arab Spring much more smoothly, at least in appearance, than did the authoritarian cleptocracies of Tunisia and Egypt, or the Mussolini-style dictatorships of Libya and Syria.
In effect, in order to postpone any significant democratic-oriented social and political reforms, Saudi Arabia and most of the other Arab Gulf countries, have opted to increase wages and provide greater social assistance as a means to buy off, co-opt and divide dissenting voices, while at the same time cracking down on more militant demands if deemed necessary. On the one hand, it should be pointed out that the very recognition of the need to provide greater social assistance could actually represent a sign of the beginning of more significant steps toward reform. On the other hand, however, there are a number of major problems to be overcome if significant reforms are eventually to be implemented.
Many Saudis, and not just the younger generation, are looking forward to change, and believe it to be absolutely necessary. Yet the first problem is that the generation gap between the aging Saudi elites and the demands of a well-educated younger population, appears to limit the possibilities of fundamental social change and political reform. More specifically, the process of choosing leaders among both aging and younger individuals within the House of Saud (through the Allegiance Council)
– combined the refusal to permit non-Saud members (men or women) into the ruling circle — makes finding effective leadership much more difficult.[1]
Te second dilemma is that ongoing military tensions with Iran — a conflict that has spread its tentacles throughout the region, with the US and Europe tightening sanctions and Israel now threatening Iran with preclusive strikes on its nuclear enrichment facilities[2] — will make it extremely difficult for the Saudi elite to engage in reform at this time.
And the third problem to be discussed is general American skepticism of Saudi Arabia’s goals and intentions.
In these circumstances, which are now threatening a conflict which could further inflame the wider Middle East, it will prove difficult for the Saudi leadership to distinguish between those domestic demands for social and political reform that are truly legitimate versus those demands that are seen as tacitly or overtly manipulated by Tehran, and which might somehow serve Iranian political interests in the short or long term.
Te problem is that International tensions always make legitimate reforms even more difficult to achieve and that, in addition to state repression itself, war is often the greatest violator of human rights. To paraphrase the words of the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which aimed at preventing wars altogether: Te recognition and the protection of human rights is both the foundation for peace among states and within states.
» Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world…
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
The US-Saudi Relationship
Te close US-Saudi relationship is based on generally common interests in energy policy, finance and geostrategy, with a present focus on the ongoing « global war against violent extremism » and the commonly perceived Iranian threat. Even though the US and Saudis do not always see eye to eye on a number of issues, the fact that the US and Saudi Arabia generally possess common interests in finding compromises to these important foreign policy concerns does not necessarily prevent ideological issues concerning democracy and human rights from entering into public debate and private discussions, often upsetting relations.
Here, the website of the US Department of State clearly outlines its concerns with Saudi human rights violations:
« Te following significant human rights problems were reported: no right to change the government peacefully; torture and physical abuse; poor prison and detention center conditions; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention; denial of fair and public trials and lack of due process in the judicial system; political prisoners; restrictions on civil liberties such as freedoms of speech (including the Internet), assembly, association, movement, and severe restrictions on religious freedom; and corruption and lack of government transparency. Violence against women and a lack of equal rights for women, violations of the rights of children, trafficking in persons, and discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, sect, and ethnicity were common. Te lack of workers’ rights, including the employment sponsorship system, remained a severe problem. »[3]
And while the State Department report is fairly strong in criticizing Saudi « human rights problems, » the fact of the matter is that American concerns with Saudi Arabia run much deeper. Tere are suspicions that the Saudi government has been responsible for a number of acts of terrorism (sin of commission), or at least knowledge that such terrorist attacks were going to take place (sin of omission).
In fact, in February 2012, former Senators Bob Kerrey and Bob Graham filed a multibillion dollar law suit against Saudi Arabia arguing, in Kerrey’s words, that « Evidence relating to the plausible involvement of possible Saudi government agents in the September 11th attacks has never been fully pursued. »[4] How this lawsuit might impact US-Saudi relations in the future remains to be seen: In my view it will probably go much the same way as did the report on the assassination on John F. Kennedy: lots of accusations and theories, but no actual proof as to Saudi involvement.
Te issue raised here is that the September 11 attacks, which involved a large contingent of Saudi citizens, plus continuing financial support by wealthy Saudis for various militant Islamist groups and causes through charities and business fronts, have raised American skepticism of Saudi government policy and intent. Tis skepticism has continued despite Saudi government efforts to disassociate itself with Bin Laden (now eliminated by Obama) and the various factions of the Al Qaeda movement. Tese kind of critiques have gained significant domestic support despite American government efforts to reaffirm a close US-Saudi relationship, and to praise, for example, joint US and Saudi efforts to cooperate in the global war against violent extremism.
As a prime example of post-September 11, 2001 attitudes toward Saudi Arabia, Mayor Rudolph W Giuliani refused to accept a $10-million check from Prince Al Waleed ibn Talal ibn Abdulaziz al Saud, a nephew of King Fahd, for a World Trade Center relief fund. Te refusal to take the check occurred after the prince had urged the U.S. government to « adopt a more balanced stance toward the Palestinian cause. » Even though the Prince condemned acts of terrorism, and stated that « We are here to tell America and to tell New York that Saudi Arabia is with the United States wholeheartedly, » the Prince’s check was returned to him, according to press reports.
Te point is that Mayor Giuliani refused to accept what he saw as the Prince’s effort to equate Israeli actions in Palestine with the September 11, 2001 attacks.[5] Te Mayor thus refused to recognize the Prince’s request that the Americans « address some of the issues that led to the criminal attack. » From the perspective of Mayor Giuliani, as well as that of other American neo-conservatives, and many liberal-democrats as well, the roots causes of Saudi citizen involvement in the September 11 attacks were not due to the American alliance with Israel or due to other controversial US policies abroad, but rather from the lack of democracy and respect for minority and human rights within Saudi Arabia and the Arab/Islamic world in general.
Americans have thus tended to point their finger at the lack of democracy and protection of human rights in Saudi Arabia in particular and of the Arab/Islamic world in general as the root of the « problem. » By contrast, the Arab/ Islamic world has tended to point their fingers at what they see as American democratic imperialism (in support of Israel or other American policies seen as « imperialistic »), combined with the whole history of European colonialism, as the root of the « problem. » As with all generalizations, both sides possess elements of truth, but neither are entirely correct. Here, for example, the Arab/ Islamic world has generally supported the Palestinian right to self-determination, but not that of the Kurds, at least until the dismantlement of the Iraqi regime.
The Question of the Misnamed « Arab Spring » and Saudi Arabia
In the post-Cold War situation, the bogeyman that justified American support for various dictatorships within the Arab/Islamic world was the ostensible pan-Islamic threat. Yet this approach was contradictory and ultimately backfired. Te policy backfired in that it was the US and Saudi Arabia that helped to boost militant pan-Islamic movements (which were essentially pan-Sunni) in the effort to: 1) undermine the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and elsewhere; 2) to contain the Iranian pan-Shi’a revolution; and 3) to deflect militant pan-Islamist movements from focusing their attention on the Saudi regime itself.
Yet as a number of differing Islamist movements gathered strength over time and in différent regions of the globe once Moscow withdrew from Afghanistan and the Taliban took over, many Arab states attempted to contain or repress all forms of Islamist ideology, whether such ideology could be considered militant or « moderate. » Tis conflict between the rise of pan-Islamist movements and various authoritarian regimes throughout the wider Middle East tended to intensify acts of repression against such movements in Egypt, Tunisia- if not causing civil war, as was the case of Algeria, when the Islamic Salvation Front was poised to win the second round of elections before the horrific conflict began.
US pressure to democratize the region, often through the support of various NGOs in support of « democracy engineering, » began to subside by 2007 at the end of the Bush administration. It would be the Obama administration who would realize that US efforts to press for democracy and human rights in the Arab/ Islamic world were not necessarily obtaining positive results, from the American perspective. Ironically, US pressures to democratize the region were actually helping to strengthen various Islamic movements who opposed what they considered American democratic imperialism.[6]
And here is the significance of Obama’s Cairo speech: Te US realized that reconciliation with the Moslem world in general (including those Islamist movements often suppressed by American allies) was necessary because groups like the Moslem Brotherhood, among others, were gaining strength behind the scenes. Te American strategic dilemma was consequently how to co-opt and splinter such Islamist movements where possible, and to prevent their further radicalization. Te key dilemma, from the American perspective, was that while domestic Arab support for differing Islamist political groups had generally tended to grow, domestic Arab support for so-called « secular » liberal democratic political movements within the Arab/ Islamic world was not as strong as the US had hoped.
Tis is not to say that Obama predicted or caused the Arab Spring, but that the American government realized that if authoritarian regimes throughout the region did not take steps toward reform and democratization and toward respecting the rights of their own people, then the possibility of radical and more militant Islamic regimes coming to power was quite possible— given the large number of possible political succession crises among aging dictators. A number of leaked Wikileak cables indicate that American ambassadors were well aware of massive corruption and the general legitimacy crisis impacting many countries in the wider Middle East.
Te December 2010 protests that took place after a Tunisian street vendor immolated himself sparked a wave of protest against dictatorial governments and against the general condition of injustice that characterized much of the Arab/ Islamic world. Cleptocractic dictatorships collapsed almost overnight in Tunisia and Egypt, while NATO intervention was deemed necessary to overthrow Qaddafi in Libya, with NATO at least initially supported by the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab League, despite general Arab skepticism of NATO goals.
Of particular concern to Saudi Arabia, the leadership of Yemen collapsed and there have been significant protests in Bahrain, with more limited public protest within Saudi Arabia itself. Tere were also protests of the Arab minority in Iranian Khuzestan in May 2011. Most of the world’s attention is presently focused on the horrific repression and conflict taking place in Syria (where the leadership of Bashir Al-Assad is increasingly judged as illegitimate by much of the Syrian population).
But as the Syrian example clearly indicates (also like the Iraq example in which the Mussolini-style dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was impelled to « democratize » after US-led military intervention), the term « Arab » Spring is really a misnomer. Te issue raised here is that these movements have not only been joined by Arabs, but include Kurds and Berbers, among other ethnic groups. In addition, the Arab population itself is divided between Sunni and Shi’ite, Sufi, Alouwite, among others. And there are many « secular » individuals who do not necessarily assert a communal or religious identity. One can also argue that there are significant domestic protest movements within both Iran and Israel.
With regard to Saudi Arabia, in the effort to head off domestic discontent, the Saudi leadership announced a $130 billion social spending program, which, it has been argued, could possibly cut into long term Saudi development funds. (It has likewise been feared that a possible steep drop in the price of oil could risk destabilizing
the regime.) Te Saudis also sent peacekeeping forces to help Bahrain stifle protests by demonstrators who were predominantly, but not exclusively, Shi’ites. Tis action was taken out of concern, in part, that Shi’a dissent could eventually spread to Saudi Arabia’s oil rich, predominantly Shi’a, eastern province, tacitly or overtly supported by Iran.[7]
In effect, the Saudi government adopted a dual policy in response to the so-called « Arab Spring. » In addition to boosting domestic social spending, the government gave considerable financial support, along with the other wealthy Arab Gulf states, to essentially Sunni social and political movements throughout the region. Moreover, the invitation of both Morocco and Jordan to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) represented an attempt to stabilize all of the Arab monarchies and to postpone the possible implementation of deeper constitutional reforms for as long as possible.
Tis approach has thus far appeared to be successful, depending on which country is considered. A recent PEW opinion poll has suggested that Turkey and Saudi Arabia have generally been regarded as greater supporters of democracy than either the democratic United States or Israel by those polled in Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Pakistan and Jordan. In addition, roughly two-thirds of those polled in Egypt and Jordan say the Saudi Arabian government favors democracy in the Middle East; about half (52%) of Pakistanis also hold this view. However, fewer than a third of Tunisians (31%) and Turks (18%) agree.[8]
Tis PEW opinion poll appears to represent yet another indication of the rapid drop of Obama’s prestige throughout the Arab/Islamic world, ironically despite his efforts to reach out to that world in his Cairo address. Here, the United States, which sees itself as the bastion of democracy, is faced with a real public relations problem. At the same time, the same PEW opinion poll reveals that solid majorities in Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan believe that democracy is the best form of government, as do a plurality of Pakistanis.
Tis fact could be considered a success for American democratic ideology. Te problem, however, is that general agreement in democratic values does not necessarily lead to agreement in foreign or domestic policy. And finally, it is important to note that while a substantial number of people in these countries desire a large role for Islam in political life, there are significant différences over the degree to which the legal system should be based on Islam.[9]
Te reason why Saudi Arabia is seen as supporting democracy abroad stems, at least in part, from differing conceptions of democracy: Democracy as « democratic governance » by majority rule; democracy as protection of minority rights and of human rights in general; and issues surrounding the « export of democracy » and external support for « democratic values. » Here Saudi Arabia has consequently been regarded as supporting the democratic aspiration of a majority of people (Sunni Moslems) against non-monarchist Arab dictatorships — even if the Saudi regime itself cannot be considered a « democracy » in any sense of the term.
Te dilemma for the US is that American perceptions of « democratic governance » and US support for the export of democracy and « democratic values » (at times by force) tend to differ greatly from the perceptions of democracy as perceived by peoples of the wider Middle East in general. Te discrepancy between American and Middle Eastern views on democracy tends to lead more to dissent and disagreement, than to ideological consensus.
By contrast, as opposed to the US-led intervention against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the NATO intervention, which was led by France and the UK and supported by the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, against the Qaddafi regime was generally seen as positive by many in the Arab world (in part because there were no western troops deployed on the ground). At the same time, the results of that military intervention have not conclusively established a « democratic » form of governance in Libya that protects the rights of its all of citizens.
In addition to supporting differing, essentially Sunni Moslem, movements throughout the Arab world, the Saudi regime has taken tiny steps to improve its image abroad by permitting Saudi women to participate in the summer Olympics — given international protests against their exclusion from the games. While not initiating fundamental change, these steps have been largely symbolic; nevertheless tiny steps forward can ultimately advance reforms. Given the focus of public attention and the global media on the issue, the question of women’s rights is crucial to eventually opening and liberalizing Saudi society, at least to a limited extent.
For its part, the US has pressed the Saudi regime to change its policies toward women in part because Americans honestly believe that such reforms are necessary, but also because the American government needs to justify its alliance with a country that has, in effect, rejected democracy as a form of governance contrary to American ideology. In other words, the US needs to show that it is pressing for reforms in the Saudi kingdom in order to obtain stronger domestic American support for the US-Saudi alliance, particularly after the shock of the September 11, 2001 attacks mentioned earlier.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that even in the US, the Equal Rights Amendment, which would guarantee women equal rights under the law, has not yet obtained sufficient support among 38 of 50 states to make it the 28th amendment to the US Constitution.[10] From this perspective, the process of implementing human rights policy is slow, perhaps too slow, even in the USA. Te question remains: for how long can Saudi regime postpone its need to engage in serious social and political reforms?
Toward Consensus on Democracy and Human Rights?
Te Human Rights debate is not just debate between US and European values with those of the Islamic world, but represents an intra-Islamic debate as well. Te debate on human rights is between the US, the Europeans, and differing political and religious factions within the Islamic world, as well as with the developing world in general. Te contemporary situation thus cannot be simplistically characterized as a clash of civilizations, but as a clash between and within differing civilizations.
At the same time, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf monarchies have engaged in inter-faith dialogues, it not always possible to translate abstract understandings into practical laws and actions that will protect and safeguard human rights, however defined. As mentioned above, even the US has yet not put the Equal Rights Amendment into law.
While Saudi Arabia abstained from signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the nature of the debates that took place in the formulation of that important document indicates that the Saudi delegation was a very active participant in those debates. Te Saudi delegate did not entirely abstain from signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights due to considerations of Islamic law from a strict Wahhabist interpretation.
While religion did play a role, Saudi abstention was based, to a large extent, on well-reasoned arguments based on a critique of European imperialism as it had attempted to dictate rights and values, due to opposition to demands that national self-determination be considered as a basic human right, and with respect to questions involving women’s rights, marriage and woman’s equality, among other issues.
Perhaps most crucially, the Saudi delegation, as well as the delegations from other Islamic countries, did not think the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sufficiently addressed the general role of society in protecting individuals. Te Arab and Moslem states also sought strong statements in support of social, cultural and economic rights.
While a full analysis would be necessary, the Saudi representative, Jamil M. Baroody, outlined his general position, arguing that human rights needed to be seen as interconnected with the larger society and that « any human rights covenant which does not explicitly safeguard economic, social and cultural rights would, at best, be no more than an affirmation of civil and political rights which are to be found in almost all national constitutions and in the statute laws of Member States. »[11] By contrast, the US opposed any reference to socio-economic rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Declaration despite Eleanor Roosevelt’s initial insistence to defend economic rights that President Roosevelt had promoted as a fundamental freedom.
Te fact that other Islamic countries besides Saudi Arabia which abstained eventually signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (with the Pakistani foreign minister paving the way[12]) indicates that the debate was not that of the so-called « clash of civilizations » between the West and Islam, but a clash between slightly differing US and European conceptions, those of the developing world, as well as those of rival Islamic viewpoints. Tis fact can help open a wider debate on the role of Islamic law with respect to human rights, which is one of the themes of this conference.
In conclusion, the reality that a general wave of « democratization » is presently spreading across the wider Middle East can help show Saudi elites that another, more democratic, path is possible, and that the protection of human rights is in the vital interests of the Saudi state and society. Assuming the region, if not the world, is not dragged into war in the coming months, a re-examination of the Saudi position and arguments as to why Saudi Arabia abstained from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could permit the Saudis to reconsider and re-institute their human rights policies in the near future.
A full-fledged inter-state and inter-social dialogue (as has been launched at this forum) could spark the process of significant social, economic and political reforms within Saudi Arabia itself — a process that has already begun throughout the wider Middle East with the advent of the misnamed « Arab » Spring.
[1]Whether the death of conservative hardliner Saudi Interior Minister (former Crown Prince), Nayef bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, will open the door to reforms remains to be seen. Nayef bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud ran the interior ministry, the internal security forces and the religious police; he was largely responsible for policies impacting the eastern provinces, Bahrain and Yemen, and was opposed to women voting or driving. On the other hand, the new Crown Prince, King Abdullah’s half-brother, Prince Salman, is 76 years old.
[2]DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT, The New York Times, « To Calm Israel, U.S. Offers Ways to Restrain Iran » September 2, 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/world/middleeast/us-is-weighing-new-curbs-on-iran-in-nod-to-israel.html?_r=1&src=un&feedurl=http%3A%2F%2Fjson8.nytimes.com%2Fpages%2Fworld%2Fmid dleeast%2Findex.jsonp
[3]US State Department, « BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR » 2010 Human Rights Report: Saudi Arabia (April 8, 2011) http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154472.htm
[4]Eric Lichtblau, « Saudi Arabia May Be Tied to 9/11, 2 Ex-Senators Say » New York Times (February 29,
2012)
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/us/graham-and-kerrey-see-possible-saudi-9-11-link.html Kenneth L. Wainstein, a former senior national security official in the George W. Bush administration, argued in response to the law suit that the senators’ assertions « might inject some temporary strain or awkwardness at a diplomatic level… even so… the United States and the Saudis have developed strong counterterrorism cooperation over the last decade, and that relationship will not be undermined. » Te State Department did not comment
[5] http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/12/news/mn-56406
The White House at the time was attempting to obtain a greater measure of support from Saudi Arabia for the war in Afghanistan.
[6]Bernard Lewis had warned of this possibility in the 1990s: « All in all, considering the difficulties that Middle Eastern countries have inherited and the problems that they confront, the prospects for Middle Eastern democracy are not good. But they are better than they have ever been before. Most of these countries face grave economic problems. If they fail to cope with these problems, then the existing regimes, both dictatorial and authoritarian, are likely to be overthrown and replaced, probably by one variety or another of Islamic fundamentalists. » See articles by Bernard Lewis, https://www. mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/blewis.htm; http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2002/01/lewis.htm http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/93feb/lewis.htm
[7]See report on Bahrain.
[8]http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/
[9]http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/
[10]Te Equal Rights Amendment, first proposed in 1923 to affirm that women and men have equal rights under the law, is still not part of the U.S. Constitution.
Te ERA was passed out of Congress in 1972 and has been ratified by 35 of the necessary 38 states. When three more states vote yes, it is possible that the ERA could become the 28th Amendment. Te ERA could also be ratified by restarting the traditional process of passage by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives, followed by ratification by legislatures in three-quarters (38) of the 50 states. http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/
[11]Universal Human Rights: Te Contribution of Muslim State; Author(s): Susan Waltz Reviewed work(s):Source: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 2004), pp. 799-844
[12]Sir Zafrulla Khan, the foreign minister of Pakistan, whose delegate on the Commission had abstained, rose in the General Assembly to defend the UN Declaration: « It is my opinion, » he declared, « that our Pakistan delegate has misinterpreted the Koran. I understand the Koran to say, ‘He who can believe shall believe; he who cannot believe shall disbelieve; the only unforgivable sin is to be a hypocrite.’ I shall vote
for acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights » By contrast, the delegate from Saudi
Arabia, Jamil M. Baroody, abstained, saying that he was quite sure King Ibn Saud would not agree with Sir Zafrulla in interpreting the Koran. » From On My Own, the autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt.
