TERRORIST CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST NATIONAL RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAQ: THE SHABAKS AS A CASE STUDY

Prof. Qais Nasir RAHAI[1]

And Prof. Abbas Atiyah Abbed AL-QURAISHI[2]

[1] Dr. Qais Nasir Rahai is a researcher in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at the Basra and Gulf Studies Centre of Basra University. He is also a university researcher affiliated with the Iraqi Centre for Documentation of Extremist Crimes, where he has published numerous articles on the party’s archives. Baas Iraq, stressing the need for Iraqi researchers to study these precious historical sources in Iraq.

[2] Dr. Abbas Al-Quraishi is a professor at Kufa University and also runs the Iraqi Centre for Documentation of Extremist Crimes.

Executive Summary: The purpose of this research is to study the crimes committed by terrorists against national religious minorities in Iraq, using the Shiite Shabak as a case study. Crimes committed against them are generally based on belief, forced displacement, genocide, ethnocide, kidnapping, murder and hostage-taking. The research is interested in a subject that has not received sufficient attention in terms of documentation and study, namely a national religious minority divided between Shia Muslims, who are the majority, and a small number of Sunni Muslims. The Shabak are only in Iraq, especially in Mosul province, north of Iraq. In addition, the research addresses these crimes through a descriptive and analytical approach, while focusing on the historical context of the violence experienced by this group, whether structural violence, embodied in cultural violence, or violence based on nationality and confession, perpetrated by the regime. Ba’ath (or Baas) before 2003, then turned into confessional violence after 2003.

Keywords: Terrorist crimes, Shiite Shabaks, Iraq, National Religious Minorities, History, Political Science, Terrorism, Human Rights.

TERRORIST CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST NATIONAL RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAQ: THE SHIITE SHABAKS AS A CASE STUDY

Abstract : This research aims to study the crimes committed by terrorists against national and religious minorities in Iraq, using the Shia Shabak community as a case study. The crimes committed against them are generally based on their religious beliefs and include forced displacement, genocide, ethnocide, kidnappings, murders, and hostage-taking. The research focuses on a subject that has not received sufficient attention in terms of documentation and study, namely a national and religious minority divided between Shia Muslims, who constitute the majority, and a small number of Sunni Muslims. The Shabak people are found only in Iraq, particularly in the Mosul province in northern Iraq. Furthermore, the research addresses these crimes using a descriptive and analytical method, while focusing on the historical context of the violence suffered by this group, whether it be structural violence, embodied in cultural violence, or violence based on nationality and religious affiliation, perpetrated by the Ba’ath regime before 2003, and then transformed into sectarian violence after 2003.

Key words : Terrorist crimes, Shiite Shabaks, Iraq, National religious minorities, History, Political sciences, Terrorism, Human rights.

Introduction

AFTER 2003, THE IRAKIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM recognized Iraq as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-faith country, in accordance with article 3 of the Constitution of 2005. Article 4 of the Constitution also guarantees the right of Iraqis to teach their children, in private educational institutions, Arabic and Kurdish official languages, or their mother tongue, or any other language. Article 14 stipulates that all Iraqis are equal before the law, regardless of sex, race, nationality, origin, colour, religion, sect, belief, opinion, economic or social status[1]. These constitutional processes are the result of the suffering of the Iraqi communities under the Ba’ath[2] and its exclusion policy. One of these communities that suffered under the Ba’ath is the Shabak. They were marginalized because of their nationality, as Shabak nationality was not recognized, and Arab identity was imposed on them. Those who chose Kurdish identity suffered the same fate as Kurds in Iraq, including forced displacement. Similarly, those who chose Arab identity suffered the same exclusions, dominations and human rights violations suffered by Shiites in Iraq before 2003.

The Shabak are the fourth largest community in Iraq after Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. They are natives of Iraq and have endured what other communities endured, and have shared with them joys and sorrows. However, despite this recognition, this did not prevent terrorist groups from committing crimes against those who oppose them in matters of religion, such as Christians and Yezidis, or against Shia, whose point of divergence is religious. Other religious and national minorities were also targeted. Some Iraqi minorities combine a national and religious identity, such as Shiite Turkmens and Shiite Shabaks.

Research objective            

The aim of this research is to study the crimes committed by terrorists against national religious minorities in Iraq, taking the Shiite Shabak as a case study. Terrorist crimes against them include forced displacement, genocide, ethnocide, kidnapping, murder, hostage-taking and belief-based crimes.

Research issues

The problem of this research is the study of a subject that has not received more attention in terms of documentation and study, namely a national religious minority – the Shia Shabak – whose citizens are divided among Shia Muslims, who represent about 70%, and Sunni Muslims.

Research methodology

The methodology of this research is based on description and analysis, focusing on the historical context of violence in this community, whether structural violence, embodied in cultural violence, or violence based on nationality and religion, which later became confessional violence. This approach has allowed us to divide the topics of research, studying the structural violence represented by cultural violence, and the subject of the crimes of the Baathist regime against the Shabak as a historical context, in order to achieve the crimes of terrorism against the Shia Shabak.

1 – Violence structurelle

The researcher believes that there is a form of violence against the Shabak, linked to the culture that has formed about them through studies and writings, as well as ideas that circulate orally, which do not represent the responsibility of a specific person, but rather the methods followed. Structural violence is ” violence which occurs without a clear and visible actor, and which is inherent in the very structure of society »[3].

This has greatly contributed to shaping an image that readers make to know the Shabaks. Personally, when I read some books – which express a common social vision – I didn’t find them right when they talked about the Shabaks, which I attended for a significant period. It is therefore necessary to describe these writings and to show that their authors are not promoters of violence, but their writings have created in the reader who does not know the Shabaks a different image of their identity and belonging.

The Shabaks themselves recognize that some researchers have encroached on their rights and despised their beliefs. To this end, the researcher will not go into the details of the beliefs of the Shabaks and what has been written about them, as this is the subject of differences among the researchers, who rely on different sources to collect their information. For example, the book The Shabaks, written by Ahmed al-Sarraf, interview to formulate his opinions. It can therefore be said that the image or reading that formed the Shabaks is divided into two categories: the first is neutral, reported by the Shabaks themselves and researchers like Zuhair Kazem Abud and others; a second, which is excessive and expresses structural violence.

1 – 1 : The first image of the Shabaks

Researchers differ on the origin of Shabaks. Some relate to Persian origins, others to Turkish origins, others to Kurdish origins or to a mixture of several ethnic groups, according to a fourth opinion. The Shiite Shabak worship the Imam Mausoleums in Karbala, Najaf, Kadhimiya and Samarra, and visit them during their religious celebrations, and organize the Husseinite rituals during the month of Muharram[4], which is of particular importance to them. Thus, they perform the pilgrimage to Mecca[5].

There is no village without a mosque or a mosque hussayniyya[6] where are fulfilled the five daily prayers and celebrated religious occasions such as the birthdays of the imams and Islamic festivals. The construction of the mosques dates back to the middle of the XX^ème After the improvement of the economic situation of the Shabak and thanks to the efforts of the Shiite religious authorities, in particular Sayyid Mohsen al-Hakim, whose role had its impact in this process. The Shabak are duodecian Shiites like the other Shiites of Iraq, and many students of the Hawza[7] are in Shabak villages. The remaining 30 per cent of Shabaks are chafeites and are in the villages of Bazwaya, Koukajli, Toubzou, Abu Jarboua, among others.[8]. Shabak language belongs to the Indo-European Arian language group[9].

Shabaks represent an independent community with its own characteristics, which distinguish them from other communities. They have settled in the plain of Nineveh, in the area between the river Khazir and the Tiger, since the XVI^e century[10]. They have experienced the circumstances and challenges of the region and Iraq in recent centuries. Theories and attempts to assimilate them to Arabs or Kurds have never been proven correct, especially since they were in their villages and regions before the arrival of many tribes and clans in the region. The Shabak do not have great future ambitions except for one: the recognition of their identity and the guarantee of their representation in a unified and independent Iraqi state, where all are equal[11].  

1 – 2: The second image of the Shabaks

Because of the concealment surrounding the reality of the existence of the Shabak in Iraq, they were the target of malicious criticism, without being able to defend themselves or reveal the falsehoods told about them. For a variety of reasons, including the absence of Shabak writers, it was difficult to counter this distorted image, as well as the difficulty of informing others about their views, and the isolation of this community. Some writings, considered as main sources for knowing the Shabaks well, have sometimes described them as extremists, sometimes claimed that they do not carry out the salat and fasting, and they do not pay zakat, and do not make pilgrimages and follow rituals similar to those of the Yezidis and Christians of the region. Some even called them unbelievers and apostats[12], causing them feelings of sadness and pain, which still persist because their neighbours question their Islamic beliefs[13].

Among the famous books that speak of them figure Shabak: one of the extremist groups in Iraq, often considered as a reference for researchers. His author had based his information on an interview with a single person, who had told him that he was a duodecian Shiite and did not believe in Shabak practices, claiming that Shabak had returned to Islam. The author then adopted this information and published it in his book[14]. Another book on this subject also exists, Remains of esoteric sects in the Mosul region[15]. One researcher mentioned that the author of this book showed his resentment against them, accusing them of inappropriate and unfounded behaviour, in order to devalue them. Thus, from this perspective, the inhabitants of Mosul and their families did not participate in the rituals common to the Shabaks[16].

 2 – Regime crimes Ba’ath against Shabak before 2003

Before 2003, Shabaks suffered under the regime Ba’ath In Iraq, their cultural identity has been erased and marginalized. This explains why, in part, they were unable to make their customs, traditions, culture and language known. The political regime before 2003 did not recognize their language, forcing them to choose Kurdish identity. Those who opted for this identity suffered the same suffering as the Kurds in Iraq, including forced displacement and genocide. Those who chose Arab identity endured the same exclusions, repressions and mass graves that the Shiite Arabs endured in Iraq.

The regime’s crimes Ba’ath included the forced surrender of their nationality, forced displacement, the prohibition of religious rites and the construction of mosques and mosques. hussayniyya. After the 1977 census, they were forced to declare themselves Arabs and were displaced and Arabized between 1988 and 1989. Many of them have been forcibly displaced from their regions[17].

One researcher claims that the suffering of the Shiite Shabaks dates back to the period of the Ottoman occupation of Iraq, where they suffered the worst forms of repression for religious reasons, including their Shiite membership. This oppression continued under the regime Ba’athwho refused to recognize that they were a separate Iraqi group and forced them to choose between Arab and Kurdish identity in the 1977 and 1987 censuses. Those who chose Kurdish identity saw their houses demolished and were forcibly moved to Iraqi Kurdistan, while those who opted for Arab identity were forced to live in marginalized and neglected areas[18].

Prior to 1990, more than 2,000 Shabak families were displaced to new residential complexes in Harir Plain, Erbil Province, Bazyan and Jamjamal areas in Kirkuk Region. However, in the autumn of 1990 the Ba’ath enabled them to return to their hometowns after they declared them Arab and not Kurdish[19]According to documents signed by Ali Hassan al-Majid, one of the main leaders of the regime Ba’ath, known for his crimes under the nickname “Alli le Chimique”. The Shabak movement was part of the final phase of a complete Arabization programme in northern Iraq adopted by the regime. Ba’ath after 1975, which had an impact on their identity and accentuated the erasure of their identity[20].

According to a report by Human Rights Watchin the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, Ba’ath in Iraq attempted to change the ethnic composition of northern Iraq by moving hundreds of thousands of Kurds and other members of minorities according to a policy of Arabisation[21].

And despite the difficult conditions that the Shabaks experienced before 2003, they managed to gain the satisfaction of their entourage. Their Arab neighbours, Turkmens and Assyrians of Mosul described them as benevolent and respectful people, characterized by honesty, integrity and loyalty. They enjoyed the trust of the capital owners in Mosul, as did the Christians. They were also known for their generous hospitality, kindness and simplicity, and it was rare to hear of a Shabak who had acted wrongly or committed a reprehensible act.[22].

The scheme Ba’ath did not allow the publication of any information concerning the Shabak or other Iraqi communities, due to its policy of exclusion vis-à-vis ethnic groups such as Kurds, Turkmens, Shabaks, and against religious denominations such as the Shiites.

3 – Terrorist Crimes Against Shiite Shabak in Iraq

Research has divided the study period on terrorist crimes into several phases.

The first phase is that of the attacks covering the period from 2003 to 2006, marked by the attack on the Mausoleum of the imams Al-Hadi (as) and Al-Askari (as), one of the most important Shiite religious mausoleums in the world, and not only in Iraq.

The second phase extends from 2006 to 2011, ending with the withdrawal of US forces on Iraqi soil in December 2011.

The third phase runs from 2012 to 2014, during which the terrorist organization Daech took control of several parts of Iraq in 2014. It was found that attacks against Shi’a Shabak did not attract adequate attention, as opposed to terrorist attacks against other minorities.

3 – 1 : The first phase of terrorist attacks, 2003-2006

The most significant terrorist acts of this period include the attack on a funeral ceremony at the “Sadryin” martyrs’ mosque in the Al-Tamim district of Mosul. A suicide bomber detonated an explosive belt inside the mosque, killing 47 people and wounding over 100[23].

3 – 2: The second phase of terrorist attacks, from 2006 to 2011

This period was marked by one of the most violent attacks in Iraq, the explosion of the village of Khazna on 10 August 2009. The report Human Rights Watch It was described as one of the worst attacks on the Nineveh Plain after 2003. Two trucks filled with explosives exploded at 5 a.m. in the village, completely destroying 65 houses, killing 35 people and wounding 200 others[24].

3 – 3: The third phase, from 2012 to 2014

This period was marked by the most violent terrorist crimes against Shi’a Shabak before the occupation of Mosul. These crimes included car bombs, assassinations, abductions, explosive devices and home invasions.

These attacks can be summarized in the following table:

3 – 4: Phase of terrorism Daesh in June 2014 and thereafter

While in the previous phases there were isolated explosion attacks against certain villages of Shia Shabak, or assassinations of some of their followers, or the displacement of some families, in the phase of Daesh and after the occupation of Mosul, there was a complete invasion of the Shabak areas. They had only two options: death or forced displacement. As this topic contains several details, it will be studied from the point of view of terrorist crimes based on belief, forced displacement, genocide, the looting and theft that they have faced, and other crimes committed against them.

3 – 4 – 1 : Terrorist crimes against Shia Shabak based on religion or belief

Violence committed in the name of religion, based on the religious beliefs of the author, is a complicated phenomenon in various parts of the world. On the other hand, violence based on religion or belief is based on the religious beliefs of the victim.[25]. Violence in the name of religion may occur through attacks targeting individuals or groups, sectarian violence, suicidal attacks, acts of terrorism, State terrorism or in the form of official policies, repressive, discriminatory laws, and other types of violent behaviour.[26].

According to a report Human Rights WatchThe Shabak have been targeted by terrorists for religious reasons, as 70% of them are Shiites, and many extremists regard Chiism as a heresy. The rebels targeted the Shiites throughout Iraq, not just those belonging to minorities. For example,Islamic State in Iraq (EI-IL), ally ofAl-Qaïda in Mesopotamia, distributed a brochure in Mosul dated 16 October 2007 calling the Shabak as rafidhis[27] and exhorting them to kill and expel them from their regions without mercy[28].

This goes back to the first phase of terrorist operations, according to the classification adopted in this research. In 2004, an audio recording broadcast on the Internet and attributed to Abu Musa The spokesman said thatAl-Qaïda in Mesopotamia declared a total war against the rafidhis wherever they are in Iraq[29].

After this recording, the Shiite religious rites commemorating Imam Hussein’s Ashura – the third Imam of the Shiites – were targeted. The results of terrorist crimes against Shia in Iraq in one day amounted to 754 victims, including 573 injured and 181 killed in Karbala, Najaf and Kadhimiya, according to a report prepared by the researcher at the Iraqi centre for the documentation of crimes of extremism.

Here is a graph showing the number of martyrs and wounded during the commemoration of Ashura throughout Iraq (2004-2023):

According to the table below, the terrorist crimes against the Shiite Shabak were mentioned in the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam al-Hussain (as) and other religious ceremonies: 

The number of victims among the Shiite Shabaks since 2003 and until 25 December 2013 amounts to 1298 martyrs[30].

According to the religious belief of the Shiites in general, the Shiite Shabak organize funerals and mourning gatherings during the first ten days of Muharram in their areas. Shabak also make pilgrimages to the Imam mausoleums in Karbala, Najaf, Kadhimiya and Samarra in Iraq[31]. These religious occasions are often the scene of terrorist attacks targeting them.

After the occupation of Mosul, all holy places representing their faith as Shia Muslims were destroyed by terrorist organizations. The mausoleums, holy places, mosques, hussainiyasvital infrastructure, homes and property of citizens have been energized after the plundering of their contents[32].

Some of the holy places that have exploded are:

1. The holy place of Imam Ali ibn Al-Hussein, in the region of Barqala;

2. The holy place of Imam Ali ibn Moussa Al-Ridha, nicknamed Abu Al-Hassan, located in the village of Tays Kharab;

3. The holy place of Al-Abbas: Al-Abbas ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, located in the village of Al-Abbasiya on the right bank of the Khosr River, near Mosul.

In the context of terrorist operations following the occupation of Mosul in June 2014, on 16 July 2014, terrorist groups occupied the village Shabak d’Omarkan, located in the Nimrud region. The village had more than 3,000 inhabitants. Thus, for religious reasons, terrorists were accompanied by agents leading them to the houses of the Shiite Shabak. The gangs Daesh abducted more than 40 Shabak citizens, looted and stole more than 70 houses, energized Ahmad Idris Arafat mosque and Al-Abbas mausoleum in the same village, causing families to flee under difficult humanitarian conditions. In addition to the village of Amurkan, the village of Qarashur was also looted and stolen. The gangs of Daesh trapped the houses after looting them, according to information from the High Commission on Human Rights in Iraq. The gangs of Daesh targeted most of the Shabak houses displaced from Kokjali village, ransacked them and trapped some of them.[33]. Signs have been placed on certain houses of the Shabak families with the letter “R” (Rafidah), used by terrorists to designate Shia Muslims[34].

On 9 December 2014, Daesh destroyed several houses belonging to Shiite Shabak in Mosul using bulldozers to destroy their homes in Kokjali and Bawzaya districts, east of Mosul[35].

3 – 4 – 2: Forced displacement

Shia Shabaks have been forcibly displaced since the years 2004-2005-2006, as the first phase after 2003, although forced displacement preceded that date, particularly under the regime. Ba’ath before 2003. Unlike other minorities, the Shabak exist only in Iraq, and the majority of them live in more than 60 villages in six administrative units, between Tal Kaif, Mosul and Hamdaniya districts. They lived in 12 residential areas on the left bank of Mosul. However, as a result of attacks by members of theAl-Qaïda, d’Ansar al-Islam and later from the Islamic State (DaeshBecause of their Shiite affiliation, many were forced to move to the villages of the Nineveh Plain in 2004, 2005 and 2006[36].

The most violent phase of the attacks against the Shiite Shabak in Mosul began in the period of sectarian violence and after the attacks on the domes of the Imam Al-Askariyin in Samarra; sectarian execution operations began, targeting this ethnic minority. More than 8,000 families have been forcibly displaced from the town of Mosul to its surroundings in the Nineveh plain, considered the ancestral land of the Shabak. Terrorists have energized some of the houses of displaced persons in Mosul, saying: ” does not sell or buy, owned by the Islamic State ” Most internally displaced persons had to sell their homes and property at low prices, abandoning their jobs and livelihoods.

When they settled in the plain of Nineveh, they lived in houses without decent living conditions. Terrorism did not stop there. Prosecution operations with booby-trapped vehicles loaded with tons of explosives targeted mosques, hussainiyasplaces of worship and displaced persons ‘ complexes, destroying entire families and razing buildings. Attacks have reached more than 25 targeted operations, including trucks and IEDs, suicide bombers and improvised explosives, in addition to individual killings of members of this community[37].

The Shabak and Turkmen fled Mosul after she was occupied by Daesh To the areas of Nineveh province, at the beginning of the occupation in June, then fled Mosul to the Shiite majority provinces of southern Iraq, according to the following pattern:

Movement of Shabak and Turkmen Shiites (June-August 2014)[38]

The first wave extended from June 6 to August 2, 2014. Throughout June, opposing armed groups expanded their geographical presence in north-eastern Iraq, threatening and marginalizing non-Sunni ethnic and religious communities, prompting them to flee quickly to other parts of Iraq and neighbouring countries. Shiite Turkmen and Shiite Shabaks were moved to the vicinity of Mosul, and most of the displaced remained there until the end of July.[39].

The second wave began from August 3 to 18, 2014. As a result of the expansion of terrorist operations in the Nineveh Plains, towards Sinjar, Zummar, and the regions north and east of Mosul, the second wave of displacement of Shiite Turkmens and Shiite Shabaks, internally displaced persons and residents began. The majority went to the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Many found refuge at the Khazer crossing point, however considered as a large starting point for Shia-majority provinces in southern Iraq, namely: Wassit, Dhi Qar, Al-Qadisiyya, Al-Muthanna, Maysan and Najaf, using two main roads to reach southern Iraq[40].

In the first wave, terrorist gangs Daesh bombarded Hamdaniya district, Twayjna village and Qaraqosh with mortars, causing mass exodus of Shabak families[41]. It should be noted that forced displacement did not cease until 2014. On 27 October 2012, eleven Shabaks families were displaced from the Sumer neighbourhood, and about 20 students left their studies at Mosul University, and the chance to resume their studies would have remained limited. After the occupation of Mosul, their displacement was total, and terrorist organizations left none in his home[42].

3 – 4 – 3 : The total genocide of Shiite Shabak

The Iraqi State has recognized that what happened to the Shabaks constitutes genocide, in accordance with article 7, paragraph 1, of the law of survivors Yezidis of 2021: ” Daesh’s crimes against the Yezidis and other components (Turkmen, Shabaks, Christians) are considered genocide and a crime against humanity ».

This was also confirmed by the report of the Special Rapporteur on minority rights of the High Commission on Human Rights, mentioning several crimes constituting genocide. For example, on 27 June 2014, the inhabitants of the Shabak village of Tabraq were taken hostage by terrorist gangs Daesh. Many Shabak families fled to the Baashiqa area on foot, pursued by members of the Daesh near the village of Bazwaya. Four people (Hussein Ali Haydar, Mohammed Ghanem Haydar, Younes Haydar Younes, Luay Abbas Jaafar) were abducted and appeared before his courts in Mosul on the morning of 28 June 2014. On the same day, two Shabaks citizens were killed by the Daesh, and their bodies were burned in the district of Jaza. 1^er July 2014, these gangs kidnapped 15 Shabak families in Mosul and took them to an unknown destination, arresting more than 100 Shabak in Nineveh and seizing 50 Shi’a Shabak houses in a belief-based genocide demonstration[43].

3 – 4 – 4: Crimes of kidnapping, murder and looting

A report by the High Commission on Human Rights in Iraq mentions that terrorist gangs Daeshon 16 July 2014, targeted most of the displaced Shabak houses in Kokjali village, kidnapping more than 100 Shabaks and taking over 50 houses[44]. Before the invasion of the Nineveh Plain region by Daeshabduction of Shia Shabaks took place, either for those who could not leave Mosul or for those in villages under their control, such as the village of Amurkan where 31 citizens were abducted, or the village of Bazwaya where 7 people were abducted. In the village of Tabraq Ziyara, citizens were abducted and killed. For example, three Shabaks Shiite prisoners were abducted from Badush prison, as well as dozens of Shabaks citizens whose fate remains unknown[45].

On 12 July 2014, six persons were abducted by the terrorist organization in the village of Bazwaya in Mosul, and ten others in the villages of Jaliokan and Kokjali on the outskirts of Mosul. On 21 July 2014, 43 Shabak families were abducted in Mosul villages and districts, including women, children and the elderly. A total of 160 Shabaks were killed by bullets or beheads, and the others were forced to leave their property and subsequently looted by this terrorist organization.[46].

The village of Shor has suffered acts of looting and robbery, and gangs of Daesh trapped the houses, as was the case for most Shabak houses displaced from the village of Kokjali, according to reports from a report of the High Commission on Human Rights in Iraq[47].

Conclusion

Minorities in Iraq have been victims of the most horrific terrorist crimes, and this has not spared the Shiite Shabaks. They suffered regime crimes Ba’ath by 2003 and its violations, such as forced displacement, the erasure of their cultural identity, persecution based on a policy of Arabisation and the suppression of their Shia religious identity.

After 2003, despite the recognition of their rights by the political system, terrorist groups committed crimes of ethnic and sectarian cleansing against them unprecedented in the history of Iraq. Comparing the scale of the disaster with the number of victims in relation to their population in Iraq, the Shia Shabaks are among the ethnic and religious minorities who have suffered the most serious crimes: genocide, belief-based terrorist crimes, forced displacement, looting, murder, and cultural eradication. The international reports and reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights confirm this. All of this calls for the preparation of a comprehensive dossier on the violations suffered by religious and ethnic minorities by Daesh and by other terrorist organizations, as a first step, and to compensate victims for the crimes and violations suffered, and to do justice by prosecuting those responsible and preventing the recurrence of such acts. n

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– Rashid Kamal Taher, “The Shabaks are their origin, religion, places” (The Shabaks, their origin, their belief and their places of residence), in Journal of University of Human Development, Vol. 3, N°3, Août 2017, p. 210 (pp. 184-218), lien : https://doi.org/10.21928/juhd.v3n3y2017.pp184-218 (accessed November 4, 2025).

– Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December 2014 (Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December 2014), Baghdad, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), December 2014, 27 p.

– « Shabak toll raise to 1300 killed », Shafaq News, 25 December 2013, link: https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/shabak-toll-raise-to-1300-killed (accessed November 4, 2025). – Sinjari Kholo Kadida, Taqrīr ʻan waḍʻ al-mukawwanāt fī al-ʻIrāq (Report on the situation of minorities in Iraq), Baghdad, High Commission for Human Rights in Iraq, March 2015, p. 15 (

[1] Constitution of Iraq, 15 octobre 2005, lien : https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/iq2005.htm (accessed November 3, 2025).

[2] Baath Party (or Baas) which means in Arabic “resurrection” or “rebirth”, with its full name: “Social Party of the Arab Resurrection” (hizb al-ba’t al-‘arabī al-istirākī), NDLR.

[3] Bassim Ali Al-Khrissan, « Structural violence : A study in Johann Galtung’s theory of explanation of the violence »

(Structural violence. Study in Johan Galtung’s theory of explaining violence), in Political Sciences Journal (the journal of political science), N° 55, 2018, p. 159, link: https://jcopolicy.uobaghdad.edu.iq/index.php/jcopolicy/article/view/23 (accessed November 4, 2025).

[4] The month of Muharram is the first month of the Hegiri calendar (NDLR).

[5] Rashid Kamal Taher, “The Shabaks are their origin, religion, places” (The Shabaks, their origin, their belief and their places of residence), in Journal of University of Human Development, Vol. 3, N°3, Août 2017, p. 210 (pp. 184-218), lien : https://doi.org/10.21928/juhd.v3n3y2017.pp184-218 (accessed November 4, 2025). See also Abbūd Zuhayr Kāzim, al-Shabak fī al-Irāq (The Shabaks in Iraq), Souleimaniye, Sardam ed., 2006, p. 94 (345 p.).

[6] One hussayniyya, ou Hosseiniyeh, is a gathering room for Shia ritual ceremonies, especially those associated with the commemorations of the month of Muharram and the martyrdom of Hussein (NDLR).

[7] Trained by several teachers who have reached the title of Jayatollah and great ayatollah, a hawza is a two-dimensional Shiite religious seminary, or may designate all the seminars of a place or city (NDLR).

[8] Al-Agha Abdulzahra, “The Shabaks. The Alliance of Iraqi Minorities”, p. 10.

[9] Ibidem, p. 12.

[10] Gasha Suhayl, Al-Shabāk (The Shabaks), Beirut, ed. Min Ajl al-Marifah, 2016, p. 36 (160 p.).

[11] Op. Cit., Abbūd Zuhayr Kāzim, al-Shabak fī al-Irāq (Les Shabaks en Irak)…, p. 23.

[12] Ibidem, p. 63.

[13] Op. Cit., Suhayl Gasha, The Shabaks…, p. 25.

[14] Al-Sarrāf Ahmad, Al-Shabāk : wāḥidat min firq al-ghulūw fī al-ʿIrāq (The Shabaks. One of the extremist sects in Iraq), Baghdad, ed. al-Ma

[15] Al-Ghulāmī Abd al-Mun’im, Baqāyā al-firaq al-bāṭiniyah fī minṭaqat al-Mawṣil (Remnants of the esoteric sects in the Mosul region), Mosul, ed.

[16] Ibidem, p. 45.

[17] Op. Cit., Rashid Kamal Taher, « The Shabaks are their origin, religion, places »…, p. 186. Ainsi que : Op. Cit., Suhayl Gasha, The Shabaks…, p. 26.

[18] Op. Cit., Abbūd Zuhayr Kāzim, al-Shabak fī al-Irāq (Les Shabaks en Irak)…, p. 22.

[19] Op. Cit., Gasha Suhayl, Al-Shabāk (Les Shabaks)…, pp. 34-35.

[20] Ibidem, pp. 35-36.

[21] “‘Iraq on fragile terrain’. Violence against minorities in conflict areas in Nineveh”, Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 11, lien : https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/10/vulnerable-ground/violence-against-minority-communities-nineveh-provinces-disputed (accessed November 4, 2025).

[22] Op. Cit., Rashid Kamal Taher, « The Shabaks are their origin, religion, places »…, p. 198.

[23] The terrorist act took place on the tenth day of December 2005. For more details: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2005/3/11/47- (accessed November 4, 2025).

[24] Op. Cit.“Iraq on fragile terrain” Violence against minorities in conflict areas in Nineveh” …, p. 28.

[25] Bielefeldt Heiner, Rapport of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 28^ème session, 29 December 2014, p. 3, link: https://www.refworld.org/reference/themreport/unhrc/2014/en/104316 (accessed November 4, 2025).

[26] Ibidem.

[27] Rafidhites, or Rafidhis, Rafidhun: means “those who reject”, or “who refuse”, or even “who resist”. This term is used in the Middle Ages by Sunni authors to refer pejoratively to the members of the Duodecimain majority current in the Shiites, for whom this title is, however, praise (NDLR).

[28] Op. Cit.“Iraq on fragile terrain” Violence against minorities in conflict areas in Nineveh” …, pp. 27-28.

[29] A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in Iraq (One face and one name: civilian victims of insurgent groups in Iraq), report, Vol. 17, N°9(E), New York, Human Rights Watch (HWR), October 2005, p. 38 (142 p.).

[30] « Shabak toll raise to 1300 killed », Shafaq News, 25 December 2013, link: https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/shabak-toll-raise-to-1300-killed (accessed November 4, 2025).

[31] Op. Cit., Abbūd Zuhayr Kāzim, al-Shabak fī al-Irāq (Les Shabaks en Irak)…, p. 94.

[32] “Shabak component. Years of Murder, Abduction and Genocide”, August 6, 2023, link: https://rojnews.news/ar/?p=154831 (accessed November 4, 2025).

[33] Sinjari Kholo Kadida, Taqrīr ʻan waḍʻ al-mukawwanāt fī al-ʻIrāq (Report on the situation of minorities in Iraq), Baghdad, High Commission for Human Rights in Iraq, March 2015, p. 15 (30 p.).

[34] Between the Millstones: The State of Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul (Between wheels: the situation of Iraqi minorities since the fall of Mosul), report, Brussels, Institute for International Law and Human Rights (IILHR), Minority Rights Group International (MRG), No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ), Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), February 2015, p. 11 (72 p.).

[35] Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December 2014 (Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December 2014), Baghdad, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), December 2014, 27 p.

[36] Nourat Shamdin, “Minority afflictions in Iraq: between violence, discrimination and elimination in permanent emigration”, Daraj, 25 December 2022, link : https://daraj.media/102033 (accessed November 4, 2025).

[37] This is what the former deputy to the Iraqi Parliament, Qusay Abbas, the representative of the Shabak community, reports to Parliament.

[38] Source : Displacement of Shabak & Turkmen Shi’a Minorities from Tal Afar & Ninewa Plains (June – August 2014), rapport REACH, 18 août 2014, 3 p., lien : https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/displacement-shabak-turkmen-shi-minorities-tal-afar-ninewa-plains-june-18-august-2014 (accessed November 4, 2025).

[39] Ibidem.

[40] Ibidem.

[41] Op. Cit., Sinjari Kholo Kadida, Taqrīr ʻan waḍʻ al-mukawwanāt fī al-ʻIrāq (Report on the situation of minorities in Iraq)…,p. 17.

[42] Report on the impact of terrorism on the human rights situation in Iraq, Baghdad, Iraqi Government Human Rights Commission, 2012, p. 77 (98 p.).

[43] Op. Cit., Sinjari Kholo Kadida, Taqrīr ʻan waḍʻ al-mukawwanāt fī al-ʻIrāq (Report on the situation of minorities in Iraq)…, p. 17.

[44] A Documentary Report on the Crimes of Daesh Gangs and the Humanitarian Situations in Nineveh Province from 10 June 2014 to 31 December 2016 (Documentary Report on Daesh Gang Crimes and Humanitarian Situations in Nineveh Province from 10 June 2014 to 31 December 2016), Baghdad, High Commission on Human Rights in Iraq, 2017, p. 7 (154 p.).

[45] Op. Cit.” Shabak component. Years of murder, kidnapping and genocide…

[46] Op. Cit., Between the Millstones: The State of Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul (Between the wheels: the situation of Iraqi minorities since the fall of Mosul)…, p. 11.

[47] Op. Cit., Sinjari Kholo Kadida, Taqrīr ʻan waḍʻ al-mukawwanāt fī al-ʻIrāq (Report on the situation of minorities in Iraq)…, p. 15.