Auteur: Jana NASRALLAH
Executive summary: This article analyses the religious structure of the Lebanese state through a historical and institutional approach. It shows that confessionalism is neither a cyclical anomaly nor a mere legacy of the past, but a lasting matrix of the organization of power. From the proto-state formulas of the 19th century to contemporary compromises – National Pact, Taif Agreement, Doha Agreement – The Lebanese political order was built around religious communities as constituent units of representation and negotiation. Far from absorbing membership within a unified sovereign framework, the state has gradually been configured as an area of intercommunal equilibrium, transforming democracy of consensus into a mechanism of veto and institutional blockage, particularly in the formation of governments and decision-making. The analysis thus highlights a fragmented sovereignty, distributed and conditioned by segmental balances, in which communities frame the exercise of state power.
Keywords: Doha Agreement, Taif Agreement, Institutional Blocking, Religious Communities, Political Confessionalism, Consociational Democracy, Segmental State, Lebanon, National Pact, Power Sharing, Fragmented Sovereignty.
Abstract: This article analyzes the confessional structure of the Lebanese state through a historical and institutional lens. It demonstrates that confessionalism is neither a temporary anomaly nor a mere legacy of the past, but rather an enduring matrix of power organization. From the protostate formulas of the 19th century to contemporary compromises-the National Pact, the Taif Agreement, and the Doha Agreement-the Lebanese political order has been built around religious communities as constitutive units of representation and negotiation. Far from absorbing affiliations into a unifying sovereign framework, the state has progressively configured itself as a space of intercommunal equilibrium, transforming consensus-based democracy into a mechanism of veto and institutional obstruction, particularly in the formation of governments and decision-making processes. The analysis thus highlights a fragmented sovereignty, distributed and conditioned by segmentary balances, in which communities frame the exercise of state power.
Keywords: Doha Agreement, Taif Agreement, Institutional deadlock, Religious communities, Political confessionalism, Consociational democracy, Segmental state, Lebanon, National Pact, Power sharing, Fragmented sovereignty.