Hall gardner
Professor and Chair
International and Comparative Politics Department American University of Paris
Trimestre 2010
I. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon pro-vided Washington a rationale to significantly boost both counter-terrorism and general defense spending. The attacks caused at least $32.5 billion in insured damages and dwarfed all previous acts of anti-state terrorism in the United States, if not in world history, in addition to killing some 3,000 people, plus poisoning many of those exposed to the poisonous fumes.
Despite the fact that much of the world gave immediate support to the United States, the question remains as to whether the American response was truly ap-propriate. The dilemma is that the Bush administrations actions in the afterma-th of the September 11 attacks possessed no clear goals or exit strategy in either Afghanistan or Iraq. The Bush administration actions confounded « Global War on Terrorism » (counter-terrorism against Al Qaeda) with war on « rogue states » (against the Taliban and then Saddam Hussein). The « Global War on Terrorism » (GWOT) has consequently opened the door to a war without end – a conflict which has recently widened into Pakistan and Yemen, and is indirectly beginning to destabilize Central Asia.
After the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, NATO, the Europeans and the UN unanimously backed American action against the Al Qaeda and their host, the Taliban. NATO invoked Article V for first time in its history for an attack on American territory -and not for an attack against Europe as had been generally been expected during the Cold War. NATO and European Union member France was the first to support UN Resolution 1368. Russia also supported UN Resolution 1368 and was instrumental in obtaining Chinese support for that resolution as well. Yet despite the fact that the UN Security Council supported the United States, and despite overall solidarity with the Americans, the Allies were divided: the US conceived itself engaged in a global « war » on terrorism while the European Union saw itself in a « fight » against terrorism. The concern for the Europeans was that the concept of « war » possessed greater domestic ramifications, costs, as well as legal and strategic ramifications, than did the concept of « fight. »
GWOT additionally divided American elites. Both President Bush and Obama have believed that Afghanistan represents a « war of necessity » while critics have called it a « war of choice. » The US, NATO and the European Union have further-more been debating parameters and costs of the overall strategy.[1] The Afghan war had been costing the Pentagon at least $2 billion a month as of October 2008. By June 2009, the cost reached $6.7 billion a month (before most of the additional troops had arrived). By 2010, President Obama opted to deploy at least 30,000 additional troops estimated to cost an extra $30 billion a year, bringing the number of U.S. service members in Afghanistan to roughly 100,000 men. NATO allies, and other partners, have thus far deployed roughly 40,000-plus troops, not to overlook private security and special forces.
In essence, « democratic-liberals » and « neo-conservatives » have aligned in fa-vor of the continuation of the war in Afghanistan against « realists », « isolationists » and « radicals » who have opposed the war for differing reasons.
In the meantime, American forces in particular appear to be increasingly overstretched between Afghanistan and Iraq, and now Pakistan with general politi-cal-economic instability spreading to Yemen and Central Asia, if not elsewhere. At the same time, al Qaida appears to focusing its remaining resources on destabilizing nuclear capable Pakistan.
II.
The Bush administration began to shift its focus away from Afghanistan and toward Iraq in 2003, in effect diverting top CIA war strategists and significant funding for development purposes away from Afghanistan and toward Iraq, ulti-mately permitting the Taliban to regroup by 2006. By contrast, Obama has sought to reduce US forces in Iraq and then augment US and Allied forces in Afghanistan.
Obama’s strategic gambit has thus been to increase US and Allied forces while at the same time building up Afghan forces, which have been slated to increase from 134,000 troops in December 2010 to some 170,000 in the future. Then, by July 2011, US and NATO forces are expected to be gradually withdrawn, and permit a renewed Afghan national army to manage security itself.
Yet the problem remains that the Pentagon has estimated that maintaining a 134,000-strong Afghan army would cost about $3 billion a year, while the Afghan economy generates only $800 million a year in total revenue. Support for Afghan troops could accordingly mean an indefinite financial commitment at the same time that Afghan army faces high rate of turnover. Many Afghan soldiers may not be committed to fighting (in fear of the consequences of ultimately losing once fo-reign forces leave); they may also find it difficult to fight in support of a government without perceived legitimacy. The Karzai government has been accused of massive election fraud in August 2009 involving between 1 to 1.5 million ballots, at the same time that voter participation around 30 to 35%. Nevertheless Hamid Karzai assumed the presidency without a second round of voting.
Moreover, both domestic and international accusations of corruption merely played into the hands of the Taliban, who denounced the « American process. » By contrast with what is often regarded as a corrupt central government, « the Talibans positive political program has at least five aspects: Justice, micropolitics, reconciliation, laissez-faire and democracy. While the Taliban will impose their will on villagers if they have to, and they often do so violently, they also have a positive agenda that seeks to entice supporters to their banner. »[2] If the US and NATO are accordingly to win the ‘hearts and minds,’ as the Americans put it, or gain the trust of the people as the French military puts it, the methods of the Taliban must be understood and foreign forces must be seen as having a legitimate purpose in eyes of the general population.
One major dilemma is that of US/NATO « collateral damage. » The socio-po-litical effects of killing Afghan civilians, which has been warned against by both Afghan and Pakistani leaders, Hamid Karzai and Asif Ali Zardari, have turned Afghan and Pakistani clans against the US and NATO in revenge for those attacks.[3]
From the American perspective, the only possible way to undercut Taliban ide-ology is to engage in concrete development projects that truly assist Afghan regional development and that directly meet the needs of the population. Yet development assistance from both governmental and non-governmental agencies and organiza-tions has been largely uncoordinated and not effective in all regions (roughly $40 billion from the USA and $20 billion from international sources since late 2001). Considerable sums may have ended up in the pockets of corrupt government of-ficials and individuals.[4] US policy seeks to provide development assistance through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). But there has been a division of labor between US and NATO troops: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces do not conduct « peacekeeping » missions or routinely patrol Afghan neighborhoods; that role is left to U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which operates in Kabul and Konduz and is planning to expand to other cities as well.[5] (Largely due to Afghan government opposition to chemical spraying, for example, their role, parenthetically, has not generally been to eliminate opium fields, a cash crop that can help fund both the Taliban and pro-government political leaders.)
Yet just as the US is building up forces to counter the Taliban resurgence, there is a major dispute between the State Department and Pentagon. For the Pentagon, the problem is to find ways to bypass the « corrupt » central government. The Pentagon thus seeks a more decentralized regional approach that co-opts tribal clans and that seeks to play them against the Taliban and internationalist jihadi forces. By contrast, the State Department still wants to include the Afghan government in the development and aid process – as local groups could go « rogue » and break away from central government controls.
In essence, Obama’s policy hopes to split essentially Pashtun opposition move-ments, by offering jobs and protection, as a means to better break up the Taliban and so as to better isolate the most radical « extremists, » such as Al Qaida. In order to better counter Taliban influence and protect the Afghan people, the Pentagon has thus planned to engage in enhanced counter-insurgency techniques, while building up Afghan security forces. The plan is to control the horseshoe-shaped area from the Helmand River Valley to Kandahar where the key economic and agricultural area is. This is also the historic invasion route to Kabul.
III.
The success of Operation Mushtarak (« Together » in Dari Persian), which was begun in February 2010 in Helmand province, with US Marines leading 15,000 foreign and Afghan troops, depends, in many ways, on convincing Afghans that they can trust the police and the government. At the same time, the success of the mission ultimately depends on the ability of Pakistan to restrain or check forces that might support resistance to US operations on the other side of the border.
One possibility is that the Afghan Taliban can simply hide out, in expecting that the foreign forces will eventually leave. There are independent reports that the Taliban are engaging with only 800 to 1,000 fighters in Marjah. Instead, the Taliban are purportedly preparing to defend major locations like Kandahar and Spin Boldak, which controls the mountainous passes between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Even with Obama’s build-up of US, NATO, and Afghan forces, largely in order to secure areas now held, it is not at all certain that US and NATO will be able to reach a position of strength soon enough in order to bargain with Taliban from a « position of strength. » This is due, at least in part, to another major, and not-so-long term problem in both Pakistan and Afghanistan: The « youth bulge » of millions of young men (from age 15 up) in both Afghanistan and Pakistan who are coming of age for bearing arms. Alienated youth could result in a possible « youth surge » against the US and NATO « surge. » Who will win the hearts, minds and trust of youth who have little hope for jobs and a better future? Karzai and NATO? Or the Mullah Omar and the Taliban?
There is additionally a clear split between US policy and that of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. On the one hand, Washington hopes to break the Taliban apart by reintegrating low level Taliban back into the Afghan society and the government. On the other hand, the Karzai government has attempted to seek some form of reconciliation with major Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar, among other aligned groups.
There is additionally a division in policy views between the American and the Pakistani government. Washington has wanted Pakistan to repress the powerful Haqqani network (who were ironically backed by the US against the Soviet Union, but which are now seen as linked to Al Qaeda) in northwest Pakistan. Islamabad, however, fears that the attempt to repress the Haqqani network could backfire and thus create an additional enemy for Pakistan – as it continues its struggle against the Pakistani Taliban and other Islamist militants, particularly in the Swat valley region, among other areas.[6]
Islamabad is much less concerned about the Taliban in Afghanistan, which is regarded by Pakistan as a means to counter Indian influence (among that of other states), and which provides « strategic depth » against India. In just the past year, Islamabad, to its credit, has sought to defeat and divide Taliban movements within Pakistan itself. The Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaida have appeared to be focusing attacks on port city of Karachi where three-quarters of NATO supplies are shipped, among other strategic areas, in addition to sending double agents to attack key CIA personnel through suicide bombing.[7]
It is furthermore crucial for Pakistan to stop the Taliban effort to control Swat – as this is the major communication link between Kashmir and Afghanistan. The control of Swat by jihadi factions could mean that the political differences between the jihadis in Afghanistan and those in Kashmir could dissolve, thus permitting them to unite. Most problematically, and despite some evidence that Al Qaeda groups and the some factions of the Taliban are beginning to break ties, Al Qaeda appears to be playing a role as a mediator between a number of Pakistani and Afghan Taliban groups. Al Qaeda’s focus increasingly appears to be on the politi-cal and economic destabilization of a nuclear capable Pakistan -instead of upon Afghanistan.
The Taliban leadership has thus far publicly opposed Afghan President Karzai’s proposals and vowed resistance against his leadership. There are, however, some indications that Mullah Omar might be willing to negotiate, but that he is opposed by hard line members of his alliance. At the same time, however, Afghan President Karzai, at least initially, criticized Pakistani officials for interfering with Karzai’s secret efforts to talk to the Taliban leadership. Islamabad had arrested a number of key Taliban leaders who were involved in secret talks, and who were using Saudi Arabia as an intermediary to negotiate with the Afghan government.[8] Saudi Arabia may be an effective mediator between Karzai and the Taliban, but Pakistani inter-ests cannot be ignored altogether.
Another major problem is that Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari is said not possess very good personal relations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Yet both governments need to find an agreement to jointly protect and develop their com-mon border, the very porous (and shifting) Durand line – with concerted international mediation and assistance.
This brings up the need for a regional approach to Afghan crisis and need for a more engaged and coordinated diplomacy between the US, Russia, China, India, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The fact that groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have begun to emerge as a more serious threat in several Central Asian countries means that the US, NATO, Russia and China need to begin closer discussions as to what to do about the crisis, along with the Central Asian states. Russia has been permitting the transport of NATO military supplies to Afghanistan over Russian territory, but more policy coordination is needed, while at the same time mediation with Islamic factions by states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar is also needed. These states can provide aid, assistance as well as overseas jobs for both Pakistanis and Afghans in the case of Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Most crucially, tensions between India and Pakistan must be cooled. India is regarded by Islamabad as an existential threat: Islamabad, for example, is concerned that India supports Baluchi separatism (denied by New Delhi), and has opposed Indian control over Kashmir. The problem raised here is that Pakistan wants to sustain a major influence in any political settlement in the conflict in Afghanistan – in order to continue to counter the influence of India, Iran and other states in the region.
Pakistani conflict with India over Kashmir tends to draw Pakistani troops away from focusing on jihadi groups within Pakistan and toward the defense of Pakistani homeland. If India and Pakistani tensions are not soon ameliorated by international mediation, there is the risk that another « terrorist » attack in India, such as the major attack in Mumbai in November 2008, or more recent attacks against Indian officials in Kabul, which have been regarded by India as committed by Pakistan itself, and not staged by rogue elements, could set ofF a new conventional, if not nuclear, confrontation between these two regional rivals, at the same time that Al Qaeda seeks to overthrow the leadership in Pakistan…
[1]Estimates of the costs of US military intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other aspects of the Global War on Terrorism range between 1 to 2 trillion dollars. See Amy Belasco, « The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 » Congressional Research Service May 15, 2009
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. Other estimates range as high as 3 billion, if not more, see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/07/ AR2008030702846.html
[2]Dan Green, « The Taliban’s Political Program » Armed Forces Journal (November 2009) http:// www.afji.com/2009/11/4294842
[3]http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8528715.stm
Sep 2009: Up to 142 civilians die in Kunduz province when hijacked fuel tankers are bombed; May 2009: US says 26 civilians died in raid in Farah province; Afghan officials say 140 died; Nov 2008: Raid on a Kandahar village destroys a housing complex leaving nearly 40 civilians dead; Aug 2008: Up to 90 people, including 60 children, killed in Herat province, UN says; July 2008: Raid in Nangarhar mistakenly kills about 50 civilians at a wedding party
[4]See critical comments by Anne Applebaum, « Fixing Failed Aid » Slate (September 23, 2008) http://www.slate.com/id/2200597/ « U.S. official promises expanded oversight in Afghanistan » Washington Post (January 12, 2010) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/ article/2010/01/12/AR2010011203257.html ; Jonathan Owen, The Independent (March 7, 2010) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/army-launches-investigation-corrupt-afghans-stealing-millions-from-aid-funds-1917436.html
[5]The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan began October 7, 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF). The pillars of the security effort are (1) OEF combat operations; (2) patrols by a U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) the formation of « provincial reconstruction teams; » (4) the establishment and training of an Afghan National Army and a police force; and (5) the demobilization of local militias.
[6]http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-46832120100311?sp=true
[7]http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/world/asia/05cia.html
[8]Islamabad had given the Taliban leadership sanctuary since 2001, but in February-March 2010, the Pakistani military arrested several key Taliban leaders who had been circumventing the Pakistani generals and the intelligence service and who were using Saudi Arabia as an intermediary to talk to Kabul. Ahmed Rashid « Why the U.S. must talk to the Taliban » Washington Post (March 18, 2010) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/03/16/AR2010031603302.html. Pakistan, however, rejected accusations that the arrest of senior Afghan Taliban members in Pakistan may have disrupted « talks about talks » between high level Taliban and Saudi Arabia (initially) and U.N. representatives. The Taliban were talking to Afghan leaders as well. At the same time, both the Americans and British appear reluctant to permit such talks. The arrests may harden the Taliban hardliners, intensifying and prolonging the conflict. « Pakistan arrests halt secret UN contacts with Taliban » (19 March 2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8575623.stm
